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Althoughdamage to themedial frontal cortex causesprofounddecision-making impairments, it hasbeendifficult topinpoint the relative
contributions of key anatomical subdivisions. Herewe use functionmagnetic resonance imaging to examine the contributions of human
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) during sequential choices between multiple alter-
natives—two key features of choices made in ecological settings. By carefully constructing options whose current value at any given
decisionwas dissociable from their longer term value, we were able to examine choices in current and long-term frames of reference.We
present evidence showing that activity at choice and feedback in vmPFC and dACC was tied to the current choice and the best long-term
option, respectively. vmPFC, mid-cingulate, and posterior cingulate cortex encoded the relative value between the chosen and next best
option at each sequential decision, whereas dACC encoded the relative value of adapting choices from the optionwith the highest value in
the longer term. Furthermore, at feedback we identify temporally dissociable effects that predict repetition of the current choice and
adaptation away from the long-termbest option in vmPFC anddACC, respectively. These functional dissociations at choice and feedback
suggest that sequential choices are subject to competing cortical mechanisms.
Introduction
An abundance of research has begun to reveal the computational
andneuralmechanisms governing binary choice in situationswhere
two options are presented anew on each trial (Platt and Huettel,
2008; Kable andGlimcher, 2009; Rangel andHare, 2010).However,
many real-world choices are made between multiple alternatives,
and in situations where one option is in a privileged position.When
shopping for cereal, for example, rather than reconsider every brand
anew,we selectour favoritebrand,unless another seems temporarily
more attractive. This strategy is computationally appealing as it ob-
verts continual complex multi-alternative comparisons. Such se-
quential multi-alternative choices are ubiquitous in the real world,
but their underlying neural substrates are poorly understood (but
see Daw et al., 2006; Pearson et al., 2009).
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and dorsome-
dial frontal cortex (DMFC) have featured prominently in value-
based binary choice studies (Rangel and Hare, 2010; Fellows,
2011; Rushworth et al., 2011; Rudebeck and Murray, 2011a). In
several studies the blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD)
response in the vmPFC and DMFC has correlated with the rela-
tive value between two decision options. Notably, however, as the
difference between values of chosen and unchosen, or attended
and unattended, options increases, the vmPFC signal increases
whereas the DMFC signal decreases (Boorman et al., 2009;
FitzGerald et al., 2009; Wunderlich et al., 2009; Lim et al., 2011).
A major challenge is therefore understanding why opposite
BOLD signals are frequently recorded in the two regions.
A separate literature has implicated dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (dACC) in behavioral adaptation. Both single cells and
BOLD signals in dACC are particularly active when subjects re-
ceive information that leads to changes in beliefs or behavior
(Behrens et al., 2007; Quilodran et al., 2008; Hayden et al., 2009,
2011b; Jocham et al., 2009; Wessel et al., 2012). Although such
effects have been conceptualized as outcome monitoring signals,
similar activity has recently been observed inmonkey dACCneu-
rons during foraging-style choices (Hayden et al., 2011a). Such
an adaptation signal, while irrelevant for nonsequential binary
decisions often studied in the laboratory, might be a key determi-
nant of the sequential multi-alternative decisions commonly
faced by humans and foraging animals, as it may instruct a
change from a long-term or default position.
A recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
study (Kolling et al., 2012) showed that dACC activity incorpo-
rated the average value of searching the environment, relative to
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engaging with known options, and associated search costs—key
variables for foraging—whereas vmPFC activity reflected the rel-
ative chosen value between two well defined options. In addition
to these variables, however, behavioral ecologists emphasize that
ecological choices are generally made sequentially (Freidin and
Kacelnik, 2011), a crucial feature of foraging not investigated by
Kolling and colleagues (2012). Furthermore, by decorrelating
tractable reward probabilities and randomly generated reward
magnitudes, we were able to dissociate short-term best options
(thosewith highest expected values (reward probability reward
magnitude) from long-term best options (those with highest re-
ward probabilities but not necessarily highest expected values).
This manipulation enabled us to investigate for the first time the
extent to which both choice and feedback signals in these regions
might reflect default positions established over several trials or
current choices.
We reasoned that examining vmPFC and dACC activity at
both choice and feedback during sequential multi-alternative
choice might further elucidate their respective contributions to
ecological choice and bridge the parallel literatures on relative
value and behavioral adaptation in dACC outlined above. We
therefore designed an fMRI experiment that dissociated short-
term best options from long-term best options and examined
activity in vmPFC and dACC during multi-alternative and se-
quential choices that included or excluded the default option,
and at feedback preceding choices in distinct reference frames.
Materials andMethods
Subjects. Twenty-two healthy volunteers participated in the fMRI exper-
iment. Two volunteers failed to use either the reward probabilities or
reward magnitudes in the task, and one failed to use reward probability,
so their data were discarded from all analyses. The remaining 19 partic-
ipants (10 women, mean age 25.2 years) were included in all further
analyses. All participants gave informed consent in accordance with the
National Health Service Oxfordshire Central Office for Research Ethics
Committees (07/Q1603/11).
Experimental task. In our fMRI paradigm, participants decided repeat-
edly between three stimuli based on their reward expectation and the
number of points associated with each stimulus option (see Fig. 1). Al-
though the number of points was generated randomly (uniform distri-
bution) and displayed on the screen, the probability had to be estimated
from the recent outcome history. The true reward probabilities associ-
ated with each stimulus type varied independently from one trial to the
next over the course of the experiment at a rate determined by the vola-
tility, which was fixed in the current experiment. More specifically, the
true reward probability of each stimulus was drawn independently from
a  distribution with a fixed variance and amean that was determined by
the true reward probability of that stimulus on the preceding trial (see
Fig. 2).To decorrelate the reward probabilities, reward magnitudes, and
expected values associatedwith each option, and between simulated cho-
sen and unchosen options, we used a simpleMonte Carlo algorithmwith
1000 simulations that aimed to reduce the summed absolute value of
correlations between our variables of interest. We simulated choices us-
ing both greedy and softmax action selection rules (Sutton and Barto,
1998), inserting into the softmax function the inverse temperature fitted
to subject choices from a previous study (Boorman et al., 2009). This
procedure gave us some insight into the extent to which chosen, best
unchosen, andworst unchosen variables would also be decorrelated. The
true reward probabilities that subjects tracked and the estimated reward
probabilities generated by the Bayesian learner are shown in Figure 2A,
and the expected values (estimated reward probabilities reward mag-
nitudes) are shown in Figure 2B. The reward magnitudes and reward
schedule that resulted from the selected reward probabilities were iden-
tical for each subject.
The three stimuli between which subjects chose were pictures of a real
face, whole body, and house (Fig. 1). The identities of the face, body, and
house were fixed for the duration of the experiment and across partici-
pants (i.e., the same three stimuli were shown throughout the experi-
ment). During the first decision-making phase, the three options and
their associated points were displayed at three locations on the screen:
left, upper middle, and right. The location at which each stimulus was
displayed was randomized across trials. When the yellow question mark
appeared in the center of the screen, subjects indicated their choices with
right-hand finger responses on a button box corresponding to the loca-
tion of each stimulus. Immediately after subjects indicated their choice,
the first feedback phase was presented: the selected option was high-
lighted by a red rectangle that framed the chosen stimulus and the chosen
outcome (reward or no reward) was presented. If the participant’s choice
was rewarded, a green tick appeared in the center of the screen, and the
red prize bar also updated toward the gold rectangular target in propor-
tion to the amount of points won on that trial. Each time the prize bar
reached the gold target, participants were rewarded with £2. If the sub-
ject’s choice was not rewarded, a red X appeared in the center of the
screen. These initial decision-making and chosen feedback phases were
presented on every trial in the experiment.
After presentation of the chosen feedback, one of three interleaved
conditions followed in pseudorandom order. In condition 1 the out-
comes for the two remaining unchosen options were presented. A green
tick or a red X appeared on the left of the two options that were unchosen
during the first decision-making phase, depending on whether they were
rewarded or unrewarded. The red prize bar did notmove. This event was
followed by presentation of the next trial. In conditions 2 and 3, partici-
pants had the opportunity to choose between the two remaining options
that were unselected by the participant at the first decision. These two
remaining stimuli maintained their spatial locations on the screen. In
condition 2 the option reward probabilities and points associated with
the two options remained identical to the first decision (Fig. 1). This
condition improved our ability to rank the two unchosen options at the
first decision on the basis of expected value.However, in condition 3 only
the reward probabilities remained the same; the points for both remain-
ing options were changed to 50 (Fig. 1). This condition improved our
ability to rank the two unchosen options at the first decision on the basis
of reward probability. For both conditions 2 and 3, participants once
again indicated their choice after a yellow question mark appeared. This
was followed by simultaneous feedback for the chosen and unchosen
options from the second decision. During this second feedback phase, a
red rectangle framed the selected option and a green tick or red X was
presented to the left of the chosen and unchosen options, depending on
whether these options were rewarded or unrewarded. If the choice at the
second decisionwas rewarded, the red prize bar updated in proportion to
the number of points won. This eventwas followed by presentation of the
next trial. There was no intertrial interval in any condition. Each event
was jittered between 2.5 and 5.5 s (uniform distribution). There were 60
trials in each condition,making 180 trials in total. Conditions were pseu-
dorandomly interleaved and were uncued. Participants earned between
£20 and 28 on the task, depending on their performance.
Behavioral model. We used a previously described Bayesian
reinforcement-learning algorithm (Behrens et al., 2007) tomodel subject
estimates of the reward probabilities. Because feedback was provided on
each option (at some stage) in every trial in our task, we assumed that
beliefs concerning the reward probabilities associated with each option
were updated equally, as is optimal. To assess this assumption, we con-
structed an additional model in which separate learning rates scaled cho-
sen and unchosen prediction errors (Boorman et al., 2011), which
yielded similar maximum likelihood estimates for chosen and unchosen
learning rates (t(18) 0.25, p 0.4).
We used a previously published Bayesian model to generate estimates
of the reward probabilities. This algorithm has been documented in de-
tail previously (Behrens et al., 2007), but we briefly describe its concept
here. The model assumes that outcomes are generated with an underly-
ing probability, r. The objective is to track r as it changes through time.
The crucial question addressed by themodel is howmuch the estimate of
r should be updated when a new positive or negative outcome is ob-
served. An unexpected eventmay be just chance or it may signal a change
in the underlying reward probability. To know how much to update the
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estimate of r onwitnessing a newoutcome, it is crucial to know the rate of
change of r. If r is changing fast on average then an unlikely event is more
likely to signify a big change in r so an optimal learner should make a big
update to its estimate. The Bayesian model therefore maintains an esti-
mate of the expected rate of change of r, referred to as the volatility, v. In
a fast-changing environment, the model will estimate a high volatility
and therefore each new outcome will have a large influence on the opti-
mal estimate of the reward rate. Conversely in a slow-changing environ-
ment, the model will estimate a low volatility and each new outcome will
have a negligible effect on the model’s estimate of r.
To allow for the possibility of interindividual differences in how peo-
ple combine reward probability and reward magnitude, we included
subject-specific free parameters that can differentially weigh probability,
magnitude, and their product, to derive estimates of the subjective ex-
pected values. In addition, we initially considered the possibility that
participants took into account the likelihood of encountering a second
decision when making initial decisions, for example, as seen in the
following:
gsci  rsci  msci  rsci msci  . . . 0.5rsbi  msbi
 rsbi msbi  rswi  mswi  rswi mswi  rsbi  50
 rsbi 50  rswi  50  rswi 50,
where, gsci, rsci, and msci are the subjective value, reward probability, and
reward magnitude associated with the chosen stimulus at trial i, and rsbi
and msbi are the reward probability and reward magnitude associated
with the best unchosen stimulus and rswi andmswi are the reward proba-
bility and reward magnitude associated with the worst unchosen stimu-
lus at trial i. Therefore  reflects the weight attributed to the possibility of
encountering a second decision. We did not find any evidence that par-
ticipants’ choices at the first decision were influenced by the prospect of
a second decision at which reward magnitudes could either remain the
same or both change to 50: estimated values of  equaled 0 or nearly 0 in
each participant. We therefore assumed that subjective value at both
decisions was computed on the basis of the current decision alone as seen
in the following:
gsi  rsi  msi  rsi msi,
where, gsi, rsi, and msi are the subjective value, reward probability, and
rewardmagnitude associated with the stimulus (face, house, or body) on
trial i. , , and  are the only free parameters in the behavioral model.
We fitted , , , and  to each individual subject’s behavioral data using
standard nonlinearminimization procedures inMATLAB (Mathworks).
Similarly, for the fMRI analysis, we can define gsc as the subjective EV of
the chosen stimulus, gsb as the subjective EV of the unchosen option with
the next highest EV, and gsw as the subjective EV of the unchosen option
with the lowest EV. Finally, the selector component of the model as-





where gs is the subjective expected value of the stimulus, and Ns is the
total number of stimuli to choose between (Ns 3 at the first decision,
Ns 2 at the second decision).
fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing. fMRI data were acquired on a
3 T Siemens TRIO scanner with a voxel resolution of 3  3  3 mm3,
TR 3 s, TE 30ms, flip angle 87°. The slice angle was set to 15° and
a local z-shim was applied around the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) to
minimize signal dropout in this region (Deichmann et al., 2003), which
has previously been implicated in other aspects of decision making. The
mean number of volumes acquired was 999, giving a mean total experi-
ment time of	50 min.
We acquired field maps using a dual echo 2D gradient echo sequence
with echoes at 5.19 and 7.65 ms, and a repetition time of 444 ms. Data
were acquired on a 64 64 40 grid, with a voxel resolution of 3 mm
isotropic. T1-weighted structural images were acquired for subject align-
ment using an MPRAGE sequence with the following parameters: voxel
resolution 1 1 1mm3on a 176 192 192 grid, TE 4.53ms, TI
900 ms, TR 2200 ms.
Datawere preprocessed using the default options in FMRIB’s Software
Library (FSL): motion correction was applied using rigid body registra-
tion to the central volume (Jenkinson et al., 2002); Gaussian spatial
smoothing was applied with a full-width half-maximum of 5 mm; brain
matter was segmented from nonbrain using a mesh deformation ap-
proach (Smith, 2002); and highpass temporal filtering was applied using
a Gaussian-weighted running lines filter, with a 3 dB cutoff of 100 s.
fMRI data analysis. fMRI analysis was performedusing FSL (Jenkinson
et al., 2012) using the default settings. A general linear model (GLM) was
fit in prewhitened data space. Twenty regressors were included in the
GLM: the main effect of the first decision-making phase, the main effect
of the first feedback phase, themain effect of the foregone outcome phase
(condition 1), themain effect of the second decision-making phase (con-
ditions 2 and 3), themain effect of the second feedback phase (conditions
2 and 3), the interaction between subjective EV associated with the cho-
sen stimulus ( gsc from here on, value) and the first decision-making
phase, best unchosen value (gsb) as determined by the model in condi-
tions 1 and 3 and the first decision-making phase, best unchosen value as
determined by subject choices in condition 2 and the first decision-making
phase,worstunchosenvalue asdeterminedby themodel in conditions1 and
3 and the first decision-making phase, worst unchosen value (gsw) as deter-
minedby subject choices in condition2 and the first decision-makingphase,
chosen value from condition 2 and the second decision-making phase, cho-
sen value from condition 3 and the second decision-making phase, uncho-
sen value from condition 2 and the second decision-making phase,
unchosen value from condition 3 and the second decision-making phase,
and six motion regressors produced during realignment. There were no
notable differences between the z-statistic maps based on themodel or sub-
ject choices, sowedefinedadditional contrastsofparameter estimates for the
best unchosen andworst unchosen values as the sum of regressors based on
themodel and subject choices. Similarly, we defined the chosen and uncho-
sen value at the seconddecision as the sumof regressors basedon conditions
2and3.Aside fromthemotionregressors, all regressorswere convolvedwith
the FSL default hemodynamic response function (gamma function, delay
6 s, SD 3 s), and filtered by the same highpass filter as the data.
Region of interest analysis. To identify regions of interest (ROIs) for
further time course analysis, we performed an initial group analysis of
chosen value at decision, which revealed positive effects (Z 
 3.1, p 
0.001 uncorrected, extent
 10 voxels) in regions within vmPFC, as well
as mid-cingulate (caudal cingulate zone) and posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC), and negative effects in dACC (rostral cingulate zone). These cri-
teria were simply used to identify vmPFC and dACC regions, as well as
any additional potential regions of interest for subsequent analyses. We
then used a leave-one-out extraction procedure to provide an indepen-
dent criterion for voxel selection from these regions (Kriegeskorte et al.,
2009): in each participant, BOLD signal was extracted from a sphere
(radius  3 mm) centered on the peak voxel within the ROI for the
contrast of chosen expected value at decision in a group model that
excluded that participant. This procedure obviates questions of multiple
comparisons, as peaks are selected from one set of data (n 1 subjects)
and tested in the independent left-out dataset. We then performed inde-
pendent statistical tests (see description below) and characterized the
time course of BOLD fluctuations in these regions.
Each subject’s BOLD time series for a givenROIwas divided into trials,
which were resampled to 300 ms and truncated based on the mean trial
length for each condition across trials and subjects. In the resampled time
series, trial events were aligned based on their mean onset times across
trials and subjects. A GLM was then fit across trials in each subject inde-
pendently, which resulted in parameter estimates at each time point for
each regressor included in the GLM. We then calculated group mean
effect sizes at each time point and their SEs, which are plotted in Figures
3, 5, 6. To ascertain which variables were reflected in BOLD activity in a
given ROI, we then fit the BOLD effect of interest with a canonical he-
modynamic response function (gamma function) aligned to the onset of
the event in each subject and calculated resulting t statistics and p values.
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Nine GLMs were tested on ROIs identified using the procedure detailed
above. The following analyseswere conducted across conditions 1–3:GLM1
(conducted on vmPFC,mid-cingulate, and PCC): yB0B1gscB2gsb
B3gsw e; GLM2 (vmPFC and dACC): yB0B1( gsc gsb)B2( gd1
gd2)  e; GLM3 (vmPFC): y  B0  B1rsc  B2msc  B3rsb  B4msb 
B5rsw B6msw e; GLM4 (dACC): y B0 B1gd1 B2gd2 B3gd3 e;
GLM5(dACC):yB0B1rd1B2md1B3rd2B4md2B5rd3B6md3
e; GLM6 (dACC): y B0 B1( gsc gsb) B2( gd1 gd2) B3(gsc
gsb)  e. The following GLM was conducted across conditions 2–3 (i.e.,
when there was a second decision): GLM7 (vmPFC, mid-cingulate, PCC,
anddACC): yB0B1gscB2gdec2scB3gdec2suc e. The followingGLM
was conducted on trials on which the default option was still on offer at the
second decision and when it was not: GLM8 (dACC): y B0 B1( gd1
gd2)  e. The following GLM was also conducted across conditions
2–3: GLM9 (vmPFC and dACC): yB0B1gscB2gdec2scB3gdec2suc
B4ch B5unch B6repch B7swdf e. g refers to expected value, m to
rewardmagnitude, and r to reward probability. ForGLMs 1–3, sc, sb, and sw
refer to the chosen stimulus, the best unchosen stimulus, and the worst
unchosen stimulus, respectively. ForGLMs3–6and8,d1,d2, andd3 refer to
default options 1, 2, and 3. For GLMs 7–8, dec2sc and dec2suc refer to the
chosenandunchosen stimulus atdecision2, respectively. ForGLM8, chand
unch refer to binary chosen and unchosen outcome regressors, and repch




We designed an fMRI task that required participants to first
choose between three options on the basis of both reward prob-
ability (which changed independently from trial to trial and had
to be learned from chosen and unchosen outcomes) and reward
magnitude (which was generated randomly and presented ex-
plicitly on the screen) and then choose between the remaining
two foregone options (Fig. 1). To obtain estimates of subjects’
trial-by-trial valuations of each of the options, we compared the
fit to behavior of three competing reinforcement-learning mod-
els of subject behavior. Participants’ choices were best described
by a Bayesian model that updates both chosen and unchosen
options (see Materials and Methods; Table 1). The focus of a
previously published paper (Boorman et al., 2011) reported anal-
yses that allowed us to determine the role of the lateral anterior
prefrontal cortex and associated brain regions in counterfactual
Figure 1. Experimental task. Subjects were faced with decisions between a face, whole-body, and house stimulus, whose locations on the screen were randomized across trials. Subjects were
required to combine two pieces of information: the reward magnitude associated with each choice (which was generated randomly and shown in yellow beneath each stimulus) and the reward
probability associatedwith each stimulus (which drifted independently fromone trial to the next (Fig. 2A) and could be estimated from the recent outcomehistory).When the yellowquestionmark
appeared, subjects could indicate their choices. The selected optionwas then highlighted by a red frame and the outcomewas presented: a green tick or a red X indicating a rewarded or unrewarded
choice. If the choice was rewarded, the red points bar at the bottom of the screen updated toward the gold rectangular target in proportion to the number of points won. Each time the bar reached
the target, subjects were rewarded with £2. One of three conditions followed in pseudorandom order. In condition 1 the outcomes (rewarded or unrewarded) of the two unselected options were
presented to the left of each stimulus, followed by the next trial. The points bar did notmove. In conditions 2 and 3 subjects choose between the two options they had foregone at the first decision.
In condition 2 the points associatedwith each stimulus remained the same as at the first decision. In condition 3 the points both changed to 50. In both conditions 2 and 3,when the yellow question
mark appeared for the second time, subjects could indicate their second choices. This was followed immediately by feedback for both the chosen option, which was highlighted by a red frame, and
the unchosen option, to the left of each stimulus. If the chosen option at the second decision was rewarded, the red points bar moved toward the target in proportion to the number of points won.
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choices and learning. Here, by contrast, we present the results of
a different set of analyses that allowed us to examine distinct
aspects of behavior and distinct aspects of brain activity: (1) the
value difference signals that should guide decisions on each trial
and trial-to-trial switching tendencies and (2) the roles of the
vmPFC and dACC.
We first examined to what extent reward probabilities and
reward magnitudes (Fig. 2A,B) associated with each of the three
options influenced behavior and whether subjects exhibited any
systematic bias toward the long-term best option. In our task the
rewardmagnitudes change randomly on each trial but the reward
probabilities fluctuate slowly through the experiment. The long-
term best option is therefore the one with the highest reward
probability, which we refer to as the default option. This is of
course not necessarily the option with the highest overall ex-
pected value (EV  reward probability  reward magnitude),
which is the short-term best option. To test for a bias in favor of
the default option, we included the reward probabilities and
rewardmagnitudes associated with the default option alongside
the reward probabilities and reward magnitudes associated
with the best (the option with the highest EV ), mid (the option
with thenexthighestEV), andworst (theoptionwith the lowestEV)
options in a logistic regression on choices of the short-term best
option. This analysis revealed that choices of the short-term
best option were driven by the reward probability and reward
magnitude associated with the best (reward probability: t(18) 
6.55, p 0.0001; rewardmagnitude: t(18) 6.03, p 0.0001) and
next best options (reward probability: t(18)  3.03, p  0.005;
reward magnitude: t(18)  4.31, p  0.0005), and the reward
magnitude but not reward probability associated with the worst
option (reward probability: t(18) 0.74, p
 0.1; reward magni-
tude: t(18) 4.17, p 0.0005) (Fig. 2C). Importantly, there was
also a significant negative effect of the default option’s reward
probability (t(18)1.93, p 0.05) but not reward magnitude
(t(18)  1.2, p 
 0.1), indicating that people were biased away
from choosing the best optionwhen the default option had a high
reward probability. This effect was present even after accounting
for any influence of the reward probabilities and reward magni-
tudes associated with the best, mid, and worst options, and even
after including choice difficulty as an additional nuisance regres-
sor in a second logistic regression (effect of default option’s re-
ward probability: t(18)  1.85, p  0.05). Behavior was
therefore not only guided by the reward probabilities and reward
magnitudes associated with the best and mid options, as is opti-
mal, but also biased away from the best option when there was an
alternative strong default preference.
We further reasoned that subjects might exhibit a general bias
toward choosing the default option. To test this possibility, we
examined the proportion of choices of the short-term best, mid,
and worst options when they were also the default option and
when they were not (Fig. 2D). A two-way repeated ANOVA re-
vealed a main effect of both default type (default, nondefault)
(F(1,18) 26.15, p 0.0001) and rank (best,mid,worst) (F(2,18)
169.43, p 0.00001), but no interaction (F(2,18) 1.7, p
 0.1).
Importantly, the main effect of default type remained after
matching both option values (F(1,18)  10.9, p  0.001) and
difficulty (F(1,18)  15.06, p  0.0002) across default and non-
default options.
Value coding in the BOLD signal
We hypothesize that separable decision processes exist in vmPFC
and dACC relating, respectively, to a comparison between cur-
rent options and behavioral adaptation from a long-term default
option. If this is the case, then several features of our task make
specific predictions of the BOLD signal in the two structures.
First, vmPFC value signals will take the frame of reference of the
current choice (i.e., they will reflect the chosen value relative to
the value of one or both of the other options), but dACC signals
will be referenced according to the default choice. Second, during
choices when the default option is not present, the vmPFC but
not the dACCwill maintain its relative value coding. Third, when
choice outcomes are observed, signals in vmPFC will influence
future choices of the chosen option, but dACC signals will influ-
ence future choices of the default option.
To test these hypotheses, we needed to identify ROIs in a way
that would not bias future comparisons. To ensure this was the
case, we performed a leave-one-out procedure to identify ROIs in
each individual that were defined from a group model incorpo-
rating all subjects except that individual (seeMaterials andMeth-
ods). This test obviates questions of multiple comparisons, as
peaks are selected from one set of data and tested in the indepen-
dent alternative dataset. This approach revealed two sets of ROIs.
First, the BOLD response in a network of regions including the
vmPFC (X,Y,Z; 2, 32,10), corresponding to cluster 2 in Figure
3A (Beckmann et al., 2009), mid-cingulate [0,10, 46, putative
caudal cingulate zone as termed by Picard and Strick (2001),
encompassing parts of clusters 5 and 6 in Fig. 3A (Beckmann et
al., 2009)], and PCC [14, 30, 42, PCC, encompassing parts of
clusters 8 and 9 in Fig. 3A (Parvizi et al., 2006; Beckmann et al.,
2009; Fig. 3B; Table 2)] correlated positively with chosen ex-
pected value (chosen value). Second, a circumscribed region in
dACC [6, 24, 34, putative anterior rostral cingulate zone, cor-
responding to cluster 4 in Fig. 3A (Picard and Strick, 2001;
Beckmann et al., 2009; Fig. 3C; Table 2)] correlated negatively
with chosen value.We extracted signal from these ROIs to test the
key hypotheses relating to the two putative competing choice
mechanisms.
Relative value during multi-alternative choice
We performed a multiple regression on the BOLD time course
from the ROIs defined above. We first looked to see whether
signal fluctuations contained a reflection of all of the different
values available during the choice (GLM1, see Materials and
Methods). These analyses revealed a significant positive effect of
the chosenEV (Vch; t(18) 2.30, p 0.05), a negative effect of the
best unchosen option’s EV (V2; t(18)2.37, p 0.05), but no
significant effect of the worst unchosen option’s EV (V3; t(18)
1.2, p
 0.1) in vmPFC (Fig. 3D). There were similar effects in
mid-cingulate and PCC (Vch: mid-cingulate: t(18)  2.36, p 
0.05; PCC: t(18) 1.32, p 0.1; V2: mid-cingulate: t(18)1.79
p 0.05; PCC: t(18)2.18, p 0.05; V3:mid-cingulate: t(18)
0.50, p
 0.1; PCC: t(18)0.93, p
 0.1).
To examine whether these regions might bear specific influ-
ence on default choices, we also considered an alternative coding
scheme according to which options are ranked in the long term,
as opposed to the current choice. As described above, the long-
term best option in our task is the one with the highest reward
Table 1. Behavioral model fits
Model Parameters per subject Log likelihood BIC
Optimal Bayesian 3 (0 predictor) 2080 4175.6
Experiential Bayesian 3 (0 predictor) 2265.8 4547.1
Rescorla–Wagner 4 (1 predictor) 2634.2 5289.1
Comparison of model fits for the complete Bayesian, experiential Bayesian, and Rescorla–Wagner models. Less
negative log likelihoods and lower Bayesian information criterion (BIC) indicate superior fits. Predictor refers to the
reward probability learning algorithm.
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probability (but not necessarily the high-
est EV). It is therefore possible to define
two regressors that can be dissociated in
our data: the relative chosen value (Vch
V2) and the relative default value (the
most probable option’sEVminus the next
most probable option’s EV: default V1
default V2). When we allowed the relative
chosen value and the relative default value
to compete in the same GLM (GLM2), we
found a significant positive effect of the
relative chosen value in vmPFC (t(18) 
3.82, p  0.001), mid-cingulate (t(18) 
2.46, p 0.05), and PCC (t(18) 1.79, p
0.05), but not of the relative default value
(all abs (t(18)) 1.0, p
 0.1; Fig. 4). These
relative chosen value effects reflected both
relative reward probability and relative re-
wardmagnitude in vmPFC (GLM3; reward
probability: t(18)  2.79, p  0.01; reward
magnitude (t(18) 2.17, p 0.05), replicat-
ing previous findings (Boorman et al.,
2009), and PCC (reward probability: t(18)
2.84, p  0.01; reward magnitude: t(18) 
1.94, p 0.05), with a similar trend inmid-
cingulate (reward probability: t(18)  1.98,
p  0.05; reward magnitude: t(18)  1.57,
p 0.1). vmPFC, mid-cingulate, and PCC
activity thus reflects the chosen EV relative
to the next best option’s EV during multi-
alternative choice. Importantly, activity in
these regions did not reflect action (or posi-
tion) values [index finger (left position),
middle finger (upper center position), ring
finger (right position)] or stimulus (body,
house, face) values (all t 1.5, p 
 0.05),
indicating that activity in these regions is
tied to the choice, rather than the action or
stimulus, in this study.
The coding scheme in dACCwas nota-
bly different. Time course analyses on
ROIs identified using the leave-one-out
procedure described above revealed that
dACC activity was indeed influenced by
long-termbehavioral strategies. Including
both relative chosen value and relative de-
fault value in the same GLM (GLM2) re-
vealed a strong significant negative effect
of the relative default value (default V1
default V2; t(18)3.77, p 0.001) and
only a trend toward an effect of relative
chosen value (t(18)1.55, p 0.1; Fig.
4). These relative default value effects in
dACCwere driven by both relative reward
probabilities (t(18)  2.03, p  0.05) and
relative reward magnitudes (t(18)  4.3,
p  0.0005) between default V1 and de-
fault V2 (GLM5). Including default values
of all three options in the same GLM
(GLM4 ) revealed a strong negative ef-
fect of default V1 (t(18)  2.84, p 
0.005), a strong positive effect of default
V2 (t(18) 3.84, p 0.001), and amodest
Figure 2. Rewardprobability, expected value, andbehavior.A, True rewardprobabilities associatedwith the face (cyan), body (pink),
andhouse (magenta) stimuli across theexperimentareplotted (dotted lines) alongside rewardprobabilities as estimatedby theBayesian
learner (solid lines).B, Expected values (rewardmagnitudes reward probabilities as estimated by the Bayesian learner) are plotted. C,
Regression coefficients froma logistic regression on optimal choices (i.e., choices of the best option) for reward probabilities (top left) and
reward magnitudes (top right) associated with the best, middle, and worst options (based on their expected value) and default option
rewardprobabilityandmagnitude(bottom).D,Proportionofchoicesof theshort-termbest,mid,andworstoptionsareplottedwhenthey
are also the default option (blue) comparedwithwhen they are not the default option (red).
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but significant positive effect of default V3
(t(18) 1.93, p 0.05) in dACC (Fig. 3E).
dACC activity is therefore best described
by the present evidence [(default V2 
default V3) default V1] favoring adap-
tation away from the default option in the
environment. Finally, we formally com-
pared the evidence favoring either cod-
ing scheme (relative chosen or relative
default value) in vmPFC and dACC. To
do so we inverted the sign of the regres-
sion coefficients in dACC so that both re-
gions would encode relative chosen and
relative default value positively (i.e., in the
same direction). A 2 2 ANOVA of these
regression coefficients revealed a signifi-
cant interaction between region and cod-
ing scheme (F(2,18)  7.57, p  0.01; Fig.
4). Together, these analyses reveal relative
value effects in vmPFC and dACC with
dissociable reference frames during tri-
nary choice.
It has been suggested that dACC activ-
ity may reflect task difficulty. To control
for this alternative explanation, we
allowed relative default value (default
V1  default V2) and choice difficulty
(abs(Vch  V2)) to compete in the
same GLM (GLM6), which revealed a
very strong effect of relative default value
(t(18)4.29, p 0.0005), but no signif-
icant effect of choice difficulty (t(18) 
0.56, p  0.29). If, alternatively, choice
difficulty is defined based on the differ-
ence between the chosen and average
value of the other options (abs(Vch 
mean(V2,V3)), then there is still a robust
effect of relative default value (t(18) 
4.31, p  0.0005), but the effect of
choice difficulty does not approach signif-
icance (t(18) 0.77, p 0.28). Yet another
possibility is to assume that task difficulty
is defined based on default (long-term
best) options (abs(default V1 default
4
Figure 3. Value coding during multi-alternative choice. A,
Reference image for comparison with B and C showing
diffusion-weighted imaging-based parcellation of the cingu-
late cortex based on clustering of probabilistic connectivity
profiles (adapted from Beckmann et al., 2009). B, C, Sag-
ittal slices through z-statistic maps relating to subjective
EV of the chosen option during decisions. Maps resulted
from a random effects group analysis that included all 19
subjects. Positive effects are shown in red–yellow (B) and
negative effects in blue–light blue (C). Maps are thresh-
olded at Z
 2.8, p 0.003 for display purposes, and are
displayed according to radiological convention. D, Time
course of the effect size of the chosen EV, V2, and V3, gen-
erated using a leave-one-out procedure (see Materials and
Methods), is plotted across the first decision-making and
feedback phases in vmPFC, mid-cingulate, and PCC. E, The
same is shown for the default V1, default V2, and default
V3 in dACC. Thick lines, mean; shadows SEM.
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V2)) rather than the choice. Once again, we observe a very strong
effect of relative default value (t(18)4.53, p 0.0005), but no
significant effect of long-term task difficulty (t(18)0.14, p
0.44), indicating that relative default value effects in dACC
cannot be explained by task difficulty.
Relative value at each decision
A brain region that compares options for the current decision
would be expected to do so whenever a choice is made.We there-
fore examined the time course of the chosen and unchosen value
effects from the second decision across both the initial and sub-
sequent decisions that followed on two-thirds of trials (condi-
tions 2 and 3). The coding of the best unchosen value in the
vmPFC, mid-cingulate, and PCC flips from negative at the first
decision to positive at the second decision when it becomes cho-
sen (GLM7; negative effect of V2 at decision 1 in vmPFC: t(18)
3.03, p  0.005; mid-cingulate t(18)  1.93, p  0.05; PCC:
t(18)2.22, p 0.05; positive effect of chosen value at decision
2 in vmPFC: t(18)  1.83, p  0.05; mid-cingulate: t(18)  4.57,
p 
 0.0005; PCC: t(18)  3.31, p  0.005), whereas the worst
unchosen value begins to be coded negatively when it becomes
the only unchosen option at the second decision (Fig. 5A; nega-
tive effect of unchosen value at decision 2 in vmPFC: t(18) 
2.25, p  0.05; mid-cingulate: t(18)  2.82, p  0.01; PCC:
t(18)1.83, p 0.05). These analyses provide strong evidence
that the vmPFC and associated regions flexibly encode the rela-
tive chosen value of the current decision, and moreover, that the
relative value signal consists of the two options’ values most per-
tinent to the comparison that is being performed (Fig. 2C).
Conversely, in the dACC there was no evidence of a flip in
coding of the best unchosen option’s value from the first to sec-
ond decision (t(18) 
 0.3, p 
 0.1) and no evidence of a relative
chosen value effect at the second decision (t(18) 
 0.25, p 
 0.1;
Fig. 5B). Examination of the Z-stat map relating to the chosen
value, unchosen value, or (unchosen value chosen value) at the
second decision failed to identify effects in any region of DMFC
even at the reduced threshold of Z
 2.3, p 0.01, uncorrected.
Furthermore, the absolute relative chosen value effect at the sec-
ond decision in vmPFC was significantly stronger than the abso-
lute relative chosen value effect in dACC (t(18) 2.20, p 0.05).
Notably, there was a trend toward an effect of the relative default
value when the default option was still on offer at second deci-
sions (GLM8; t(18)1.40, p 0.1), despite the largely reduced
number of such trials, but not when it had already been chosen at
the first decision and was therefore no longer available (t(18) 

0.35, p
 0.1). Indeed, on these latter trials, we were unable to
find any effects of relative or absolute value in either frame of
reference (all t(18) 
 0.25, p 
 0.1). These analyses suggest that
during repetitive decision making, dACC encodes relative value
only when the default option is available to choose.
Future choices
The data presented so far are suggestive of distinctive roles for the
vmPFC and dACC, with vmPFC activity reflecting variables rel-
evant to the decision at hand and dACC activity reflecting vari-
ables relevant to the long-term best option. If vmPFC is
concerned with comparing the currently available choice op-
tions, then itmight also determinewhether it is worth continuing
with that most recent choice on the subsequent trial. If dACC
plays a role in determining whether to adapt behavior away from
the default option in the environment, conversely, then dACC
activity might predict future switches away from that option. We
therefore tested whether there was an effect on trial n of re-
peating or switching choices on trial n  1 with respect to
either the most recent choice made on trial n or the default
option. At the time feedback was presented for the second
choice in a trial, there was elevated vmPFC activity preceding
trials on which subjects went on to repeat their most recent
choice, relative to trials on which subjects went on to switch
from their most recent choice (Fig. 6A; GLM9 t(18) 2.63, p
0.01). However, there was no effect at feedback preceding tri-
als on which they would repeat or switch away from the default
option (t(18) 1.0, p
 0.1). In contrast, analysis of the dACC
time course revealed a significant effect of switching away
from the long-term best option that also occurred immedi-
ately before the onset of the new trial (Fig. 6B; t(18) 2.40, p
0.01), but not of repeating or switching away from the most
recent choice (t(18) 1.0, p
 0.1). Formal comparison of the
two coding schemes at feedback revealed a significant interac-
tion (F(2,18)  7.58, p  0.01). Importantly, the chosen and
counterfactual outcomes and their EVs were included in the
respective GLMs, so these perifeedback effects cannot be ex-
plained by either chosen or counterfactual outcomes or their
expectations.
Discussion
Wehave identified a functional dissociation between vmPFC and
dACC during sequential multi-alternative choice. vmPFC ad-
Figure 4. Comparison of chosen and default reference frames. Effect sizes of the relative
chosen value (chosen EV next best option’s EV) and inverse relative default value (default
V2 default V1) at the first decision are plotted for vmPFC (dark gray) and dACC (light gray).
Both regressors were entered in the samemultiple regressionwithout orthogonalization, since
there was a substantial orthogonal component.














value of the chosen
option during the
decision phase)
vmPFC 11 R 2, 32,10 3.23
PCC 18 R 14,30, 42 3.66
Mid-cingulate 57 N/A 0,10, 46 3.73
Inverse chosen
subjective value
dACC 14 R 6, 24, 34 3.43
Details of regions identified from a whole-brain group-level analysis on all 19 subjects, for positive and negative
effects of the contrast of chosen value at decision. Regions are listed that survived voxel-based thresholding of Z

3.1,p0.001uncorrected, extent
10 voxels. It shouldbenoted that this procedurewas only used to identify ROIs
for further tests using the leave-one-out procedure described (see Materials and Methods). dACC, dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
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opted the frame of the current choice, whereas dACCadopted the
frame of the default option. vmPFC encoded the relative value
between the chosen and next best option at each sequential
choice, findings consistent with a system that flexibly compares
the best two available options in the environment for the current
choice. In contrast, we found that dACC encoded the current
advantage of switching away from the long-term best option in
the environment, only when it was available to choose, consistent
with a mechanism for determining when to adapt behavior away
from the default position.
A recently developed recurrent cortical circuit model
(Wang, 2008; Hunt et al., 2012) predicts that the integrated
activity of neuronal pools in a decision-making network will
correlate with the chosen relative to the unchosen option’s
value during binary choice. We found that vmPFC, mid-
cingulate, and PCC encoded the chosen relative to next best
option value, a signal that may correspond to predictions from
such a biophysically inspired decision network, pointing to
the possibility that vmPFC and associated regions may consti-
tute at least part of a decision network during goal-based
choice. Notably, a comparison between the best two options
would also be predicted by a recent computational account of
trinary choice (Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). This interpreta-
tion is also consistent with impairments in decision-making
seen following selective lesions of medial OFC, a subdivision
of vmPFC, but not lateral OFC, in monkeys, particularly when
the proximity between options’ values makes comparison dif-
ficult (Noonan et al., 2010; Rudebeck and Murray, 2011a, b),
and following damage to vmPFC in humans (Fellows, 2007).
One alternative possibility is that vmPFC, mid-cingulate, and
PCC encode the net subjective value of the decision at hand
(Tanaka et al., 2004; Daw et al., 2006; Hampton et al., 2006; Kable
andGlimcher, 2007; Tomet al., 2007). In the present experiment,
the net value signal would constitute the value of the preferred op-
tion minus the next best option. Such an effect is consistent with a
value signal that incorporates the opportunity cost—the value of the
next best option on offer in the environment—anddiscards inferior
options. This finding suggests the possibility that neural activity in
these regionsmayunderlie the sensitivity of behavior toopportunity
costs emphasized in economics (McConnell and Brue, 2004). That
vmPFC activity in the current study decreases with the value of the
next best option dovetails with demonstrations that vmPFC activity
decreases as other costs associatedwith the outcome, such asmoney
(Tom et al., 2007; Basten et al., 2010) or delay (Kable andGlimcher,
2007; Pre´vost et al., 2010) increase (Rangel and Hare, 2010;
Rushworth et al., 2011).
An interesting question concerns whether vmPFC activity re-
flects differences between the chosen and next best alternative or
the best two options. In our task, as in most situations, these are
not possible to dissociate due to their high correlation and our
reliance on a behavioral model to infer subjects’ valuation of
options. Distinguishing between these possibilities would be an
interesting avenue for future research.
We also found that vmPFC activity just before a new trial
predicted choice repetition over and above any effect of rela-
tive value, chosen or counterfactual outcomes. Notably, such a
choice repetition effect is inconsistent with the influential no-
tion that vmPFC damage causes perseveration—the inability
to inhibit a previously rewarded choice—and that vmPFC
thus promotes behavioral flexibility. It instead suggests that
vmPFC is important for promoting previously rewarded
choices. It is notable, however, that almost all cases of vmPFC
damage also exhibit damage to many neighboring frontal re-
Figure5. Value coding during sequential choices. A, Time course of the effect size of the
chosen value of the first decision, the chosen value at the second decision, and the uncho-
sen value at the second decision from conditions 2 and 3 are plotted across both decisions.
Top row, vmPFC; second row, mid-cingulate; third row, PCC. B, The same is shown for
dACC. Images are displayed according to the same conventions used in Figure 3.
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gions and the consequences of damage are tested in a limited
number of behavioral situations. When a focused lesion is
made to the medial OFC in macaque monkeys, switch rates are
indeed elevated, particularly when the proximity between op-
tions’ values makes comparison difficult (Noonan et al., 2012).
Although these monkeys do not exhibit behavioral inflexibil-
ity, they are unable to focus their decision space on the two
most relevant or valuable options (Noonan et al., 2010) and
make choices that are less internally consistent (Rudebeck and
Murray, 2011a, b), consistent with the finding that vmPFC
activity reflects a comparison between the chosen and next
best option’s values reported here. Extending previous reports
(Gla¨scher et al., 2009), we were able to show that a choice
repetition effect in vmPFC also occurs during the period di-
rectly preceding a new trial and is dissociable from relative
chosen value effects that occur during decisions.
We found that behavior was biased away from the best
option by the allure of the default option and that subjects
exhibited a general tendency to prefer the default option (Fig.
2C,D). Our fMRI results show that in the context of sequential
multi-alternative choice, dACC adopts a default reference
frame. We propose that the dACC encodes a decision variable
whose magnitude corresponds to the relative value of adapting
behavior from the default position. This interpretation is
based on several features of dACC effects in the current study.
First, dACC activity that could not be explained by the relative
chosen value could be explained by the relative default value.
Second, the sign of the relative value signal in dACC [(default
V2  default V3)  default V1] is consistent with a region
encoding the evidence supporting adaptation away from,
rather than choices of, the default option. Third, dACC only
encodes the relative value when the default option is on offer.
Fourth, dACC activity just before the onset of a new trial
predicts switching away from the default option, but not the
recently chosen option, on that new trial, again pointing to a
role tied to the default position. As in vmPFC this future
choice effect survived the inclusion of relative value, chosen
and counterfactual outcomes in the same GLM. Importantly,
including these nuisance regressors ensures that the dACC
effect at feedback cannot simply be explained by value differ-
ence or error-related responses (Fig. 6).
Our interpretation accords well with a recent electrophys-
iological study in monkeys (Hayden et al., 2011a), which
showed that the population of dACC
neurons encodes the relative evidence
for a patch-leaving decision during se-
quential foraging decisions. The BOLD
findings from dACC we have presented
are thus consistent with population
coding of dACC neurons in monkeys, as
well as previous demonstrations that the
dACC plays a general role in voluntarily
selecting or adapting choices on the ba-
sis of reinforcement history (Shima and
Tanji, 1998; Walton et al., 2004;
Kennerley et al., 2006; Johnston et al.,
2007). They also extend a very recent
demonstration (Kolling et al., 2012)
that dACC activity recorded in humans
incorporates key variables of foraging
decisions to sequential and multi-
alternative choices—two cardinal fea-
tures of ecological choice. In the present
study, we additionally reconcile choice and feedback-related
dACC activity and suggest that dACC activity reflects a more
general decision variable—the evidence favoring adaptation
away from any default position. Finally, our findings comple-
ment a recent demonstration that switches from a default op-
tion during nonsequential choices between mixed gain/loss
gambles may depend on the balance of activity in caudate and
anterior insula (Yu et al., 2010).
The interpretation of the choice-related dACC signal as
promoting behavioral adaptation brings choice and outcome
signals in the dACC into line. During outcome monitoring,
single-unit and BOLD activity reflect the change in beliefs or
behavior that will ensue from observing an outcome
(Rushworth and Behrens, 2008). That the choice-related
dACC signal might also reflect the urge for behavioral change
opens up the possibility for a combined theory that will ex-
plain these two previously incongruous forms of activity.
It is important to note that our characterization of dACC is
not necessarily inconsistent with recent demonstrations that ac-
tivity in DMFC scales with relative unchosen value even in tasks
where decisions are not repetitive (Hare et al., 2011). In such
situations, where there is no identifiable default position, we hy-
pothesize that dACC and vmPFC reference frames would align
with the current choice.
A natural question concerns the precise relationship be-
tween vmPFC and dACC-centered systems. We hypothesize
that there will be situations in which vmPFC and dACC-
centered systems compete, such as when the default position
conflicts with the current choice because another option is
temporarily more attractive, and situations in which they co-
operate, such as when the default position aligns with the
current choice. Understanding the contextual dependence of
vmPFC–dACC dynamics represents an important step for fu-
ture research.
In our previous report (Boorman et al., 2011), slightly
more dorsal regions of DMFC and posteromedial cortex
(PMC) than the dACC and PCC regions identified here also
encoded the relative unchosen probability and counterfactual
prediction errors. Further inspection of the more dorsal
DMFC region revealed that it exhibited rather similar coding
to the dACC region reported here, although it was more sen-
sitive to probabilities compared with magnitudes than was
Figure 6. Future choice effects. Time course of the effect of future stays compared with future switches with reference to the
second choice in a trial is plotted alongside the effect of future switches compared with future stays with reference to the default
option in vmPFC (A) anddACC (B). Regressors shownwere included in the sameGLMs, in addition to the chosen and counterfactual
outcomes and their associated EVs (data not shown for clarity).
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dACC, suggesting a possible gradient. In contrast, coding in
themore dorsal region of PMC and themore ventral PCCwere
strikingly different, with dorsal PMC reflecting relative un-
chosen probability and PCC reflecting relative chosen value.
This distinction parallels that seen between anterior PFC
(aPFC) and vmPFC (Boorman et al., 2009, 2011) and suggests
that aPFC, DMFC, and PMC may form one functional net-
work and vmPFC, mid-cingulate, and PCC, a neighboring
functional network, which are relatively more concerned with
behavioral adaptation and flexible comparative evaluation
during explicit choices, respectively.
Wehave characterizedvalue comparison signals invmPFC,mid-
cingulate, PCC, and dACC during trinary and sequential choice.
Our findings suggest that the best and next best options have privi-
leged status during value comparison in vmPFC,mid-cingulate, and
PCC. We propose that the effects we observe in vmPFC reflect the
comparison of the best two options from a competitive decision-
making mechanism during goal-based choice. The findings in
dACC, on the other hand, concur with the perspective that dACC
encodes a decision variable whose magnitude amounts to the cur-
rent evidence favoring adaptationaway fromadefault position.Col-
lectively, these findings endorse the view that behavior is guided by
multiple controllers and should serve to inform computational
models of value-based decisionmaking.
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